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Abstract
In the context of social dilemmas, previous research has shown that human cooperation is mainly based on the social norm
of conditional cooperation. While in most cases individuals behave according to such a norm, deviant behavior is no
exception. Recent research further suggests that heterogeneity in social behavior might be associated with varying genetic
predispositions. In this study, we investigated the relationship between individuals’ behavior in a public goods experiment
and the promoter-region functional repeat polymorphism in the monoamine oxidase A gene (MAOA). In a dynamic setting
of increasing information about others’ contributions, we analyzed differences in two main components of conditional
cooperation, namely the players’ own contribution and their beliefs regarding the contribution of other players. We showed
that there is a significant association between individuals’ behavior in a repeated public goods game and MAOA. Our results
suggest that male carriers of the low activity alleles cooperate significantly less than those carrying the high activity alleles
given a situation where subjects had to rely on their innate beliefs about others’ contributions. With increasing information
about the others’ cooperativeness, the genetic effect diminishes. Furthermore, significant opposing effects for female
subjects carrying two low activity alleles were observed.
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Introduction
Antisocial behavior can be conceptualized as a failure to
conform to social norms. Social norms are standards of behavior
that are based on widely shared beliefs on how individuals ought to
behave in particular situations [1]. In the context of social
dilemmas [2], human cooperation is mainly based on a social
norm of conditional cooperation: cooperate if the others cooperate
and defect otherwise. Conditional cooperators thus follow the
famous tit-for-tat strategy [3], which underlies many evolutionary
models [4]. Individuals that violate cooperative norms choose to
defect rather than cooperate, a choice that is always harmful to
others.
By now, there is little scientific doubt that both nature and
nurture contribute to observed variation in antisocial behavior [5–
7]. Arguably, the clearest link between this kind of behavioral
pattern and allelic variation exists for the monoamine oxidase A
gene (MAOA) [8,9]. The gene encodes MAOA, which is a key
enzyme responsible for the degradationofneurotransmitters such as
serotonin, dopamine and norepinephrin in the brain [10]. Various
association studies [11–16] confirm that the low enzyme expressing
alleles(MAOA-L)predict- atleastformales- antisocialbehavior.We
expect that subjects with less transcriptionally-efficient alleles will
fail to conform to the social norm of conditional cooperation.
In this work, we refer to voluntary contributions to the provision
of public goods as the main variable of interest. We investigated by
means of an economic experiment to what extent observed
behavior and beliefs about others’ behavior are a product of
biological as well as environmental factors. Public goods settings
are of considerable concern in various fields such as economics
[17], biology [18] and psychology [2]. This research has
established four basic facts: a) people contribute sizeable shares
of their endowments even in situations in which it is a rational
strategy to contribute nothing, b) relatively high initial levels of
contribution tend to diminish over time, converging towards zero
contribution [19], c) multiple behavioral types exist that point to
large preference heterogeneity [17,20], and d) people behave
mostly as ‘‘conditional cooperators’’, i.e., their contributions to the
public good depend directly on how group members are believed
to behave [1,21,22].
Economic experiments may be considered as ‘‘atomic mea-
sures of economic traits’’ [23]. In this sense, they are especially
suitable to measure individuals’ preferences under different
environmental conditions, therewith providing the means to assess
gene-environment interactions. We used a standard repeated
public goods experiment to elicit people’s preferences towards
cooperation. With respect to genotypes, we followed the targeted
association study approach by focusing on a candidate gene, which
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key empirical findings have motivated our decision to study the
association between decisions in public goods experiments and
MAOA. The catabolic activity of the encoded enzyme has made
MAOA a very attractive candidate in the study of neurological
diseases as well as psychiatric and behavioral traits [24]. The gene
encoding the MAOA protein is located on chromosome Xp11.23-
11.4 [25] and harbors a genetic length polymorphic repeat (LPR)
in its promoter region [26]. The MAOA-LPR consists of a 30 bp
repeated sequence and is present in 2, 3, 3.5, 4 or 5 copies. Alleles
with 3.5 and 4 copies are transcribed more efficiently compared to
those with 2, 3, or 5 copies. In most populations, the 3 and 4
repeat alleles are the most common, whereas the 2, 3.5, and 5
copy alleles are rare [16,26].
Association studies have shown that carriers of the low acti-
vity MAOA (MAOA-L) have a higher vulnerability to develop
psychiatric disorders such as antisocial personality disorder,
conduct disorder [12], antisocial alcoholism [13–15] and panic
disorder [16]. Several brain imaging studies were able to link the
MAOA-LPR to brain function during cognition, emotional arousal
and personality tests. In particular, MAOA-L predicted hyperre-
sponsiveness of the amygdala, a brain area involved in emotion-
processing that may contribute to increased depression and
anxiety [27]. Cohort studies in human and non-human primates
[26,28] showed that MAOA-L was associated with aggression and
antisocial behavior only in combination with childhood maltreat-
ment, highlighting the significance of gene-environment interac-
tion in psychiatry [9,29]. Recent literature also suggests that
individuals with MAOA-L are more likely to react with aggression
to challenges [30]. The clearest genetic evidence that MAOA
regulates human behavior has been described by Brunner and
colleagues in a Dutch family with manifestation of a complex
behavioral syndrome including borderline mental retardation and
impulsive aggression. In the affected males, a nonsense mutation
resulted in a MAOA deficiency and in increased aggressive
behavior [8]. It was shown that MAOA deficient mice were more
aggressive but also showed more efficient emotional learning [31].
More recently, an association between MAOA and political
behavior was found: individuals with MAOA-H were more likely
to vote [32]. Furthermore, MAOA was investigated in neuroeco-
nomic studies showing that high activity MAOA was associated
with attitude towards longshot risks [33] and MAOA-L with
aggression only after provocation in a power-to-take game [34].
These previous observations motivated us to study MAOA with
respect to social decision-making and cooperation.
Imperfect conditional cooperation [1,17] is the prevailing social
norm in public good settings, i.e., most individuals contribute a
little less than what they believe others would do. Due to the
finding that beliefs are adapted according to others’ contributions
observed in the past (and past beliefs) [35], the environmental
variation in our setting was implemented by by using a repeated
experiment over ten rounds. After each round, subjects were
informed about other group members’ average contribution. In
this way, step by step, subjects received increasing information in
the form of feedback about others’ contributions. As previously
shown [21], an individual’s belief in a given period is the weighted
average of the belief about others’ contributions in the previous
period and the observed contributions in the previous period.
Thus, the first period of our game was different from all the
remaining ones. In the first period, individuals were not yet able to
observe others’ actual contributions: they had to rely on their
innate or ‘‘home-grown’’ beliefs about others’ contributions. We
expected that if MAOA had an effect on individuals’ contributions
and beliefs, we should observe the effect in the first round of the
game. In subsequent periods, adaptive belief learning should take
place: subjects update their beliefs based on the belief and the
observed others’ contributions from the previous round. When the
social environment provides additional feedback, individuals can
adjust their behavior and expectations accordingly. Thus, the
genetic influence is expected to be dominated by the social
environment in later rounds.
Recent findings by McDermott et al. [34] pointed out for the
first time the importance of the interaction between social
environment and genetic predisposition in the context of an
economic experiment. The authors show that the MAOA gene
does not directly code for aggressive behavior, but affects behavior
as a consequence of a direct stimulus from the environment.
Without denying the particular importance of strong stimuli for
genetic differences, we tested the complimentary hypothesis: genes
may play a prominent role if there is no information on how one
should behave. Our experimental setting allows to correlate MAOA
and individuals’ own willingness and expected willingness of others
to cooperate, including the investigation of environmental effects,
i.e. increasing feedback about the cooperativeness of others.
Methods
The experimental setup was based upon the standard public
goods paradigm with the classic voluntary contribution mecha-
nism. The design replicated a well-known experimental design
[21]: each subject in a group of four had an endowment of twenty
points (with a monetary equivalent of 60 Eurocent). The
endowment could be split between private and public investment.
All subjects played simultaneously and anonymously. The total
sum invested in the public good by all subjects was multiplied by
a factor of 1.6 and then divided equally among the players,
regardless of the individual contribution. Thus, it was collectively
rational to contribute everything, but rational, selfish players
contributed nothing to the provision of the public good,
regardless of what the others did. This means that individuals
who behaved according to their economic incentives did not
cooperate but free-ride.
Group composition was randomly rematched every round
(strangers design) over 10 periods. At the end of each round,
subjects were asked to indicate their belief about the average
contributions of others. Afterwards, subjects received information
about the average contribution of the other group members. Thus,
the setting is characterized by increasing information about others’
cooperativeness.
We arranged observations into four stages. The first stage
reflects a situation where subjects had no information about
others’ behavior. Therefore, their behavior should be based on
innate attitudes and beliefs. As a consequence, behavior in the first
round is different from subsequent periods: it discloses whether
individuals hold a rather positive or negative view of the society
they live in. In the second round, subjects were able to observe one
group contribution from the previous round and so on up to the
tenth round where they were able to observe behavior from nine
previous rounds. In this way, step by step, more information about
others’ cooperativeness was provided and contributed to a clearer
picture of the social environment. We categorized period 1 as a
situation of no information (stage 1), periods 2–4 as a situation of
low information (stage 2), periods 5–7 as medium information
setting (stage 3) and periods 8–10 as high information environment
(stage 4). In summary, environmental variation is given by an
increase of additional feedback about others’ contributions.
We decided to employ mixed gender sessions due to the fact
that individuals are asked to engage in social interaction and the
Genetic Susceptibility for Cooperation Preferences
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important, it is well known that group gender composition affects
individual decision-making [36,37]. Thus, we expected men in all-
male groups to behave differently than men in mixed gender
groups. As our intention was to study the latter, we studied mixed
gender groups, but focused on the behavior of males.
Both men and women were assigned to two groups: male
carriers of 4 repeats were assigned to MAOA-H, carriers of 3
repeats to MAOA-L (Text S1 for MAOA genotyping). As most
[34,38] but not all [16] previous studies assigned heterozygous
women to the group of MAOA-H, we followed their example: The
high activity group consisted of 3/4 and 4/4- genotype, the low
activity group of 3/3-genotype. This assignment resulted in 33%
MAOA-L men (which equals the average proportion found in
Western European subject pools) and 19% MAOA-L women (5
subjects were excluded from the analysis due to genotyping
problems). With the help of an ex post questionnaire, we were able
to administer background characteristics such as age, field of
study, the number of friends within an experimental session and
various personality measures. We found that potential differences
in behavior between genotypes cannot be attributed to differences
in these background characteristics as they do not differ at a 5%-
level between MAOA-H and MAOA-L for male and female
subjects (Mann-Whitney tests, two-sided).
We hypothesized that subjects hold individual social norms of
behavior and individual beliefs about the behavior of others in every
round.However, we expected innate beliefs only to be observable in
the first period, whereas adapted beliefs are measurable in all
subsequent periods. Furthermore, we hypothesized that, first,
MAOA-L men contribute on average less to the provision of the
public good than MAOA-H subjects if variants of MAOA had an
effect on cooperative behavior. Second, carriers of the low activity
alleles would hold rather negative beliefs about the cooperativeness
of their peers, thus displaying a pessimistic attitude. Third, with
respecttothegene-environment interaction,MAOA-Lshouldhavea
stronger impact on contribution decisions in earlier stages than in
later stages. Thus, we would expect that in the initial stage, the gene
should play a dominant role in explaining contributions as well as
beliefs, whereas the genetic influence should diminish over time.
Experiments including real incentives have the advantage of
measuring individual innate characteristics in a population under
highly controlled conditions. Thereby, we assessed whether MAOA
has some predictive power for contribution decisions as well as
belief formation over the cooperativeness of others. Furthermore,
we studied a gene-environment interaction in the context of an
economic experiment, which has previously only been done by
McDermott et al. [34]. We investigated an environment in which
the amount of information about others’ behavior increases over
time. Thus, we added a dynamic perspective to the discussion by
assessing the impact of the gene on contributions and beliefs
dependent on various levels of information about the behavior of
others and updated beliefs about others’ behavior. As far as we
know, this is the first study to explore a main gene effect in a public
goods experiment and provides new insights into cooperation
preferences.
Results
In the first round, participants contributed approximately half of
their endowment (mean~8:49;SD~5:94). Contributions as well
as beliefs declined constantly over the 10 rounds. On average, the
actual contributions were slightly lower than the beliefs about how
much the others would contribute (mean~1:35;SD~3:02) and
the difference was significantly different from 0 (one-sample t-test,
Pv0:001). Furthermore, contributions correlated positively with
beliefs (Spearman rank correlation test, r~0:64, Pv0:001). The
two latter facts indicate that most of the participants were imperfect
conditional cooperators with a slight self-serving bias. In other words,
they contributed slightly less than what they thought the others
would. Overall, the data presented here replicated the results
commonly obtained in public goods experiments. Furthermore, we
could verify our assumption that the first stage is different from
subsequent ones in that players had to rely on their innate beliefs
about others’ contributions. Following Fischbacher and Ga ¨chter
[21], we investigated the dynamics of the belief formation process
using an econometric model. In particular, we analyzed the role of
the initial belief across stages (Table S1). As hypothesized, the
initial belief had a significant influence in the second stage, while
the coefficient decreased towards zero and became insignificant in
stage three and four.
Behavior of male subjects
Both MAOA-H and MAOA-L subjects were on average con-
ditional cooperators: both groups exhibited similarly high and
significant correlations between contributions and beliefs (correla-
tion coefficient: MAOA-H r~0:75, Pv0:001; MAOA-L r~0:67,
Pv0:001). Furthermore, no significant difference regarding the
deviation of the contributions from the beliefs was found between
MAOA-H and MAOA-L carriers (P~0:863). Thus, subjects with low
activity MAOA alleles were on average imperfect conditional
cooperators, too; we did not observe a genetic susceptibility for
violation of the prevalent social norm. Yet, as will subsequently be
shown, an impact of allelic variation observed when mapping
the contributions and beliefs over different levels of environmental
variation. In order to identify gene-environment interactions,
participants’ contributions and beliefs were subjected to a 2
(MAOA-H versus MAOA-L)64 (stages) ANOVA, with repeated
measures on the latter factor. The results regarding actual
contribution (Figure 1A) showed no significant main effect for
allelic variation (P~0:273) but a significant interaction effect
between allelic variation and contributions over the stages
(P~0:012). This indicates that the differences in the contributions
between high and low carriers of MAOA were dependent on the
level of information about the others’ contributions. Equivalent
effects were obtained when all 10 periods were examined (Text S3).
Significant interaction effects for within-subjects contrasts (differ-
ence) were found in the final stage compared to the previous stages
(P~0:019), but not for the remaining stages (P~0:411; P~0:066).
Plannedfollow-upindependent t-tests(Table1)showedthat MAOA-
L carriers contributed significantly less in stage one (P~0:036)a n d
two (P~0:041,) but not in stage three (P~0:294) and four
(P~0:689). Non-parametric test results were equivalent (Text S4).
Overall, the results provided first evidence for a gene-environment
interaction regarding the participants’ contributions: in an
environment with a low amount of information about others’
contributions (stage 1 and 2), MAOA-L carriers contributed
significantly less to the public good; however, in later stages,
contributions were independent of allelic variation. With regard to
the beliefs about others’ contributions (Figure 1B), a significant
main effect for allelic variation (P~0:040) as well as a significant
interaction effect between allelic variation and contributions over
the stages (P~0:041) was found. Using all 10 periods replicates the
results at the 10%-level (Text S3). Significant interaction effects for
within-subjects contrasts (difference) were found in the final stage
compared to the previous stages (P~0:008), but not for the
remaining stages (P~0:160; P~0:498). The follow-up indepen-
dent t-tests (Table 1) revealed that MAOA-L carriers exhibited
significantly lower beliefs about others’ contribution in stage one
Genetic Susceptibility for Cooperation Preferences
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not in stage four (P~0:421). Non-parametric test results were
equivalent (Text S4). The results regarding the beliefs about the
counterparts’ contributions largely resembled the results found for
the actual contributions. It seems, however, that expectations about
others’ contributions were more susceptible to allelic variations as
reflected in the significant main effect. Furthermore, the beliefs also
appeared to be more insensitive to environmental variations as
convergent beliefs between MAOA-L and MAOA-H carriers were
only observed in the final stage.
Behavior of female subjects
In line with previous studies, 3/4- and 4/4-genotype females were
assigned to the high activity group and 3/3 genotype females to the
low activity group. This classification was also supported empirically
(Text S5 and Figure S1). Both low and high activity carriers exhibit a
significant positive correlation between beliefs and actual contribu-
tions (correlation coefficient: MAOA-H r~0:54, Pv0:001; MAOA-L
r~0:77, Pv0:001), indicating a tendency for imperfect conditional
cooperation. Yet, female MAOA-L carriers on average show a
significant higher tendency for other-serving behavior (P~0:006).
With regard to contributions, a significant main effect for allelic
variation (P~0:001) as well as a significant interaction effect between
allelic variation and contribution over the stages (P~0:002)w a s
found (Figure 2A); equivalent results were obtained when using 10
periods (Text S3). Interaction effects for within-subject contrasts
(difference) were significant from stage two to stage one (P~0:031)
and from stage three to the previous stage (P~0:003); however, not
Figure 1. Dynamics of contributions and beliefs of male subjects. A: Average contributions over four stages. B: Average beliefs over four
stages.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020959.g001
Table 1. Average contributions and beliefs of male subjects.
average contribution average belief
MAOA-L MAOA-H MAOA-H - MAOA-L MAOA-L MAOA-H MAOA-H - MAOA-L
mean (SD) mean (SD) Difference mean (SD) mean (SD) Difference
stage 1 4.45 (6.56) 8.73 (5.99) 4.27 (P~0:036) 6.73 (4.54) 10.50 (2.87) 3.77 (P~0:013)
stage 2 5.03 (4.60) 8.05 (4.53) 3.02 (P~0:041) 7.70 (2.94) 9.65 (2.82) 1.95 (P~0:037)
stage 3 5.76 (4.50) 6.71 (4.80) 0.95 (P~0:294) 6.15 (2.97) 8.24 (3.15) 2.09 (P~0:039)
stage 4 5.76 (5.24) 4.79 (5.25) 20.97 (P~0:689) 6.15 (4.48) 6.41 (2.82) 0.258 (P~0:421)
n 11 22 11 22
Notes: P-values refer to one-sided T-test results.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020959.t001
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differences in the contributions between high and low carriers of
MAOA were mediated by the amount of information about others’
cooperativeness, providing further evidence for a gene-environment
interaction. In contrast to the male group, however, the female
MAOA-L carriers contributed significantly more to the public good. A
further difference between femaleand male participants was revealed
by the follow-up independent t-tests (Table 2). While no significant
difference in the contribution to the public good was found in stage
one (P~0:524)f o rf e m a l eMAOA-L carriers, females contributed
significantly more in stage two (P~0:015), stage three (P~0:002),
and stage four (P~0:004). Contrary to men, females exhibiting low
activity MAOAcontributed not onlymore, but also reacted to changes
in environmental conditions in an opposite way.
With regard to the beliefs about others’ contributions (Figure 2B),
no significant interaction effect was observed (P~0:405). Likewise,
the interaction effects for within-subject contrasts (difference) were
non-significant (P~0:358;P~0:171;P~0:669). Yet the female
MAOA-L carriers hold significantly higher beliefs regarding the
contribution of others as reflected in the main effect for allelic
variation (P~0:024). The follow-up independent t-tests (Table 2)
show that the difference is driven by the final stages. Similarly to
the contributions, significant differences were found in the final
two stages (P~0:007;P~0:009) but not in the first two stages
(P~0:606;P~0:061). Additionally, MAOA-L female carriers con-
tributed on average even higher amounts than the amount they
expected others to provide. Although the difference is not
statistically significant (Pw0:137, t-test, two-sided), this finding
provides a first hint for a potential correlation between MAOA-L
and altruistic behavior among females.
Overall, the results for female participants substantiated the
influence of allelic variation on contribution behavior and beliefs
as well as the interaction between allelic variation and environ-
mental condition. The female participants, however, exhibited
opposite patterns compared to males. As for male participants, our
primary group of interest, the effect of allelic variation was more
dominant in environmental conditions of low information about
others’ behavior; the opposite seemed to hold true for female
participants. Furthermore, relative to male MAOA-L carriers, the
female participants with a low activity level of MAOA contributed
more to the public good and also held higher beliefs about others’
contributions.
Discussion
By focusing on a particular candidate gene and its association
with individual behavior in experimental games, we identified
causal pathways through which genetic variations influence
economic decision-making. We investigated the genetic basis of
cooperative behavior in a public goods experiment. It has
previously been suggested that a neural network is involved in
social norm compliance [39,40] and that genetic mechanisms
regulating dopaminergic and serotonergic synaptic transmission
might contribute to the explanation of social behavior. Among the
genes related to neurotransmitters, the MAOA gene is a prime
candidate as it encodes an enzyme that degrades neurotransmitters
with the number of tandem repeats polymorphism impacting
transcriptional efficiency. Given a large body of research
suggesting that MAOA-L is associated with antisocial behavior
(leading to its nickname ‘‘warrior gene’’), we hypothesized that
Figure 2. Dynamics of contributions and beliefs of female subjects. A: Average contributions over four stages. B: Average beliefs over four
stages.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020959.g002
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than cooperate, would contribute smaller shares of their endow-
ments (if any), and would be more susceptible to violations of the
social norm of conditional cooperation. Furthermore, we hypoth-
esized that MAOA-L males would hold more pessimistic expecta-
tions about the cooperativeness of others.
Our results support the view that a genetic source of individual
variation in human cooperation exists: MAOA-L male carriers
contributed significantly less to the public good than MAOA-H
subjects in the first and early time periods. With additional
information about the others’ behavior, the role of MAOA
diminished. Although both genotypes are on average conditional
cooperators, they had significantly different expectations in the
first rounds: MAOA-L subjects were on average conditional
cooperators with pessimistic beliefs about others’ contributions,
MAOA-H individuals were rather characterized as optimists. Thus,
rather than consciously violating the prevalent social norm of
conditional cooperation, carriers of the low efficient alleles
remarkably held lower initial expectations about their social
environment and this pessimistic view might have driven different
behavior between genotypes. Although not easy to determine, twin
and adoption studies showed that pessimism itself is a heritable
trait, with heritability estimates of about 25% [41]. Whether
MAOA, or other genes, directly affect pessimistic or optimistic
attitudes in general has yet to be determined.
Although there is still no consensus on the explanation of the
well-known decay in contributions in repeated-round settings, the
idea that the clue is to be sought in conditional cooperative
behavior has received particular attention [1,20,21,42]. It has long
been argued [42] that the majority of individuals in public goods
games uses information about the average group contributions as
an anchor for its own future contribution: those who are above
(below) the average in one round decrease (increase) their
contribution in the following round. Our results are in accordance
with Neugebauer et al. [35] who evaluated several competing
hypotheses and found that the one of conditional cooperation and
adaptive belief learning is the only viable one. In a recent study
[21], it has been shown that it is the ‘‘imperfectness’’ of conditional
cooperation that leads to the decay: people do not perfectly match
others’ contributions, but contribute a little less than what they
observe or expect. This ‘‘self-serving bias’’ leads to a fall in
contributions over time. Indeed, if an entire group consists of
imperfect conditional cooperators, group contributions will decline
over time. The presence of free-riders is not necessary for this
scenario, although it would speed up the downward trend.
Given a scenario of conditional cooperators (be it imperfect or
perfect ones) who differ in their initial beliefs, Chaudhuri [43]
suggests two types of players: those with optimistic and those with
pessimistic initial beliefs. Whereas optimists start out with high
contributions, those with pessimistic beliefs contribute less in the
first rounds. Over time, both types are able to observe the
contributions of their peers and adapt their own contributions
accordingly: pessimists increase their contributions, while optimists
decrease them. Additionally, we found a genetic basis for the
differences in the distribution of initial beliefs: MAOA-L carriers
are the pessimists and MAOA-H carriers hold more optimistic
beliefs. As MAOA-L genotypes on average only account for one
third in a given population and their contribution increases are too
small to offset the decrease of optimistic MAOA-H carriers, we can
observe the stylized fact of a continuous decay over time.
Up to now, little is known about the origins of belief
heterogeneity. This is the first work which studies the association
between a particular gene and beliefs about the cooperativeness of
peers. Our research suggests that there are robust exogenous
sources of variation in initial beliefs that converge over time and
may so explain converging contributions to the public good. We
are not aware of any study which has analyzed a gene-
environment-interaction like the one studied here: we investigated
not only static behavior, but the dynamics of adapting contribu-
tions and beliefs in the presence of increasing information about
others’ behavior. Our research has been driven by the hypothesis
that a gene alone does not determine complex social behavior.
Instead, we tried to contribute to the understanding of the
interplay between gene effects, environmental effects, and gene-
environment-interaction effects in causing variation in economic
phenotypes.
Our study revealed considerable gender differences with respect
to genetically modulated voluntary provision of public goods.
Whereas males acted essentially as hypothesized in our experi-
ment, with MAOA-L carriers contributing less to the provision of
the public good compared to MAOA-H carriers, females behaved
contrariwise. However, recent studies on gender differences in
cooperation and competition demonstrated that in their social
environment females on average cooperate more than men [44].
On the other hand, the genetic influence is more pronounced in
women in later rounds. These behavioral patterns may be due to
evolutionary selected different strategies of the sexes to enhance
their reproductive fitness, demanded by historically different social
environments of both males and females. The social psychology of
women is characterized by higher genetic relatedness and different
kinds of need such as defending their offspring and creating a
supportive social network [45]. Genes in general may have
opposing behavioral associations in men and women. On the one
hand, sex hormones such as testosterone and estrogen and their
Table 2. Average contributions and beliefs of female subjects.
average contribution average belief
MAOA-L MAOA-H MAOA-H - MAOA-L MAOA-L MAOA-H MAOA-H - MAOA-L
mean (SD) mean (SD) Difference mean (SD) mean (SD) Difference
stage 1 10.27 (5.00) 9.04 (5.88) 1.23 (P~0:524) 9.55 (3.01) 8.94 (3.61) 0.06 (P~0:606)
stage 2 10.42 (4.70) 6.61 (4.49) 3.81 (P~0:015) 9.58 (2.66) 8.00 (2.42) 1.58 (P~0:061)
stage 3 9.82 (5.13) 3.61 (2.92) 6.21 (P~0:002) 8.15 (2.59) 6.06 (2.12) 2.09 (P~0:007)
stage 4 8.45 (4.92) 2.92 (2.70) 5.53 (P~0:004) 6.88 (2.37) 5.12 (1.81) 1.76 (P~0:009)
n 11 47 11 47
Notes: P-values refer to two-sided T-test results.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020959.t002
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development of the brain [46,47]. For example, high testosterone
exposure in early life leads to more male-typical behavior and
brain structure, which leads to differing responses of the sexes to
environmental stimuli later in life [47]. For instance, empathy, a
personality characteristic which is on average higher in females
than in males, seems to be reduced by higher testosterone levels
[48]. Another possible explanation for the different behavior of
males and females in our study might be due to the influence of
estrogens on the differentiation of dopaminergic neurons in the
brain and its role as a neuromodulative reagent [49]. On the other
hand, X-chromosomal genes such as MAOA have specific effects
on social cognition and emotional regulation [50]. Males are
prone to be influenced by X-linked haploidy and to show deficits
in mental abilities because of the direct impact of genetic
variations carried in the haploid state [50]. Particularly, MAOA
has been shown to have differing associations. MAOA association
studies consistently show a sex-by genotype interaction [13,27,51],
although the evidence where it stemmed from is ambiguous: one
group of studies reported that behavioral effects of MAOA
variation were more pronounced in males than in females in
both animal [52] and human [8,27] studies. Another group of
studies, however, described opposing patterns of association in
men and women [53,54]. For example, women carrying the
MAOA-H showed a higher risk of being high alcohol consumers,
whereas among men, MAOA-L was related to higher alcohol
consumption [51]. Among girls with psychosocial risk, MAOA-L
conferred an increased risk for criminal behavior, whereas among
men, the short (3-repeat) allele and social risk interacts to predict
criminal activity [55]. Meta-analyses showed highly inconsistent
gender differences in social preferences [36], suggesting that
women might be more sensitive to the context of social decision-
making experiments.
Rather than using self-reported data, we studied the actual
behavior of participants in a controlled laboratory experiment,
thus complementing mounting survey results about the role of
MAOA. In doing so, we made a contribution to an emerging
literature using economic experiments to examine the role genetic
variation plays in explaining behavioral heterogeneity [56–61].
Moreover, we contributed to the emerging literature on the
neuroeconomics of decision making in general [62,63]and to a
new research area called genoeconomics [23] in particular. The
purpose of genoeconomics is to investigate how individual genetic
variation interacts with the social environment to influence
economic traits. Indeed, different alleles of MAOA seem to
influence individual heterogeneity in cooperativeness and expec-
tations thereof depending on the dynamics of others’ behavior.
Our results suggest that social scientists might take seriously the
idea that genes too contribute to variability in cooperation.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Informed written consent was obtained from all subjects for
participation in the economic experiment and collection of buccal
cells. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the
University of Trier.
Experimental Design and Procedures
A totalof96students(60womenand36men)whowererecruited
using ORSEE [64] participated voluntarily in this study. The
subjects (mean age 24.8+/23.3) were all students from different
disciplines at the University of Trier. We conducted four sessions
with 24 subjects each in June and July 2010. A post-experimental
questionnaire confirmed that participants were largely unacquaint-
ed with one another. Following a standard rule in economic
experiments, subjects were paid according to their decisions and
those by group members. The repeated public goods game was part
of a sequence of tasks. Before subjects played it they had to fill in a
contribution table therewith playing a strategic public goods game.
Fischbacher and Ga ¨chter [21] found that the experimental
sequence does not have any behavioral effect in these games. Since
we used exactly their experimental protocol, we refer the reader to
the original source and to the Appendix for any details. The
repeated public goods game lasted about 45 minutes and subjects
earnedonaverage 12.32Euro(roughly$18,includinga show-upfee
of 5 Euro).
The computerized experiments were conducted in the comput-
er lab of the University of Trier using the software z-Tree [65].
Subjects were randomly allocated a computer terminal on a local
network that was monitored and controlled from the experiment-
er’s terminal. To ensure that all activity in the experiment was
completely anonymous, subjects were separated by a dividing wall,
group composition changed randomly every period, and no
subject would ever learn about paired group members or their
history of play. These procedures eliminated concerns for
reputation or revenge. Subjects received written instructions
which were read aloud in order to make sure that everybody
understood that the instructions were identical for all participants.
To make sure that subjects understood the rules of the game and
the incentives, they had to answer ten control questions which all
had to be answered correctly by all subjects before proceeding.
After the experiment, subjects donated buccal cells for genotyping.
Experimental instructions are reported in Text S2.
Statistical Analysis
In line with the directional (undirectional) hypotheses we
reported one-tailed (two-tailed) test statistics for the planned
follow-up t-tests with regard to the male (female) participants. The
data were tested for Gaussian distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test) and sphericity (Mauchly-W). As departures from normality
were observed in some instances, we additionally reported the
results of the non-parametric tests in the appendix. When
sphericity was not assumed (Mauchly-Wv0.05), the Green-
house-Geisser correction was applied. Finally, the ten rounds of
the experiment were aggregated to four stages in order to improve
statistical properties of the data and clarity of the results. The first
round was defined as stage one as the participants had no
information about others’ contribution. The remaining nine
rounds were equally divided into three stages and aggregated by
taking the mean of three rounds. The results for the non-
aggregated ten rounds are, however, reported in the appendix.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Dynamics of contributions and beliefs of
female subjects separated by genotype. A: Average
contributions over four stages for 3/3, 3/4, and 4/4 genotypes. B:




Text S2 Experimental Instructions.
(PDF)
Text S3 Results from Ten Rounds.
(PDF)
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